JOSEPH NYE
Project Syndicate

Joseph S. Nye is a professor at Harvard University and has been ranked as the most influential scholar on American foreign policy in the past twenty years.

DAVOS ”“ As Arab regimes struggle with demonstrations fueled by Twitter and Al Jazeera, and American diplomats try to understand the impact of WikiLeaks, it is clear that this global information age will require a more sophisticated understanding of how power works in world politics.

That is the argument of my new book, The Future of Power. Two types of power shifts are occurring in this century — power transition and power diffusion. The transition of power from one dominant state to another is a familiar historical pattern, but power diffusion is a more novel process. The problem for all states today is that more is happening outside the control of even the most powerful of them.

As for power transition, much attention nowadays is lavished on a supposed American decline, often with facile historical analogies to Britain and Rome. But Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the apogee of its power, and, even then, it did not succumb to the rise of another state, but suffered a death by a thousand cuts inflicted by various barbarian tribes.

Indeed, for all the fashionable predictions that China, India, or Brazil will surpass the United States in the coming decades, the greatest threats may come from modern barbarians and non-state actors. In an information-based world of cyber-insecurity, power diffusion may be a greater threat than power transition.

What will it mean to wield power in the global information age of the twenty-first century? Which resources will produce power?

Every age produces its own answers. In the sixteenth century, control of colonies and gold bullion gave Spain the edge; seventeenth-century Holland profited from trade and finance; eighteenth-century France gained from its larger population and armies; and nineteenth-century British power rested on industrial and naval primacy.

Conventional wisdom has always held that the state with the largest military prevails. In an information age, however, it may be the state (or non-state) with the best story that wins. Today, it is far from clear how to measure a balance of power, much less how to develop successful survival strategies for this new world.

Most current projections of a shift in the global balance of power are based primarily on one factor: projections of countries’ GDP growth. They thus ignore the other dimensions of power, including both hard military power and the soft power of narrative, not to mention the policy difficulties of combining them into successful strategies.

States will remain the dominant actor on the world stage, but they will find the stage far more crowded and difficult to control. A much larger part of their populations than ever before has access to the power that comes from information.

Governments have always worried about the flow and control of information, and the current period is not the first to be strongly affected by dramatic changes in information technology. What is new — and what we see manifested in the Middle East today — is the speed of communication and the technological empowerment of a wider range of actors.

The current information age, sometimes called the “Third Industrial Revolution,” is based on rapid technological advances in computers, communications, and software, which in turn have led to a dramatic fall in the cost of creating, processing, transmitting, and searching for information of all kinds. And this means that world politics can no longer be the sole province of governments.

As the cost of computing and communication comes down, the barriers to entry decline. Individuals and private organizations, ranging from corporations to NGOs to terrorists, have thus been empowered to play a direct role in world politics.

The spread of information means that power will be more widely distributed, and informal networks will undercut the monopoly of traditional bureaucracy. The speed of Internet time means that all governments will have less control over their agendas. Political leaders will enjoy fewer degrees of freedom before they must respond to events, and then will have to compete with an increasing number and variety of actors in order to be heard.

We see this as American policymakers struggle to cope with today’s Middle East disturbances. The fall of the Tunisian regime had deep domestic roots, but the timing caught outsiders, including the US government, by surprise. Some observers attribute the acceleration of the revolution to Twitter and WikiLeaks.

As the Obama administration formulates policy towards Egypt and Yemen, it faces a dilemma. In Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime has provided important assistance in dealing with the threat from Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorism. In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak’s rule helped to moderate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and balanced Iranian power in the region. Simplistic endorsement of democracy by George W. Bush’s administration was costly both in Iraq and in Gaza, where elections gave rise to a hostile Hamas-led government.

In an information age, smart policy combines hard and soft power. Given what the US is, the Obama administration cannot afford to neglect the soft-power narrative of democracy, liberty and openness.

Thus, Obama and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have issued public as well as private appeals for reform and change in Egypt and the wider Arab world, while also urging limits to violence by all parties. Moreover, they have aligned themselves with freedom of information in the face of efforts by the Egyptian regime to block Internet access.

How events in the Middle East will play out is anyone’s guess, but in today’s information age, upholding the freedom to access it will be an important component of smart power.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011. www.project-syndicate.org